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Abstract 
Causal models defined in terms of a collection 
of equations, as defined by Pearl, are axiom­
atized here. Axiomatizations are provided 
for three successively more general classes of 
causal models: ( 1) the class of recursive theo­
ries ( those without feedback), ( 2) the class of 
theories where the solutions to the equations 
are unique, ( 3) arbitrary theories ( where the 
equations may not have solutions and, if they 
do, they are not necessarily unique). It is 
shown that to reason about causality in the 
most general third class, we must extend the 
language used by Galles and Pearl. In ad­
dition, the complexity of the decision proce­
dures is examined for all the languages and 
classes of models considered. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The important role of causal reasoning-in prediction, 
explanation, and counterfactual reasoning-has been 
argued eloquently in a number of recent papers and 
books [Chajewska and Halpern 1997; Heckerman and 
Shachter 1995; Henrion and Druzdzel 1990; Druzdzel 
and Simon 1993; Pearl 1995; Pearl and Verma 1991; 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 1993]. If we are to 
reason about causality, then it is certainly useful to 
find axioms that characterize such reasoning. The way 
we go about axiomatizing causal reasoning depends on 
two critical factors: 
• how we model causality, and 
• the language that we use to reason about it. 
In this paper, I consider one approach to modeling 
causality, using structural equations. The use of struc­
tural equations as a model for causality is standard in 
the social sciences, and seems to go back to the work of 
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Sewall Wright in the 1920s ( see [Goldberger 1972] for a 
discussion); the particular framework that I use here is 
due to Pearl [1995]. Galles and Pearl [1997] introduce 
some axioms for causal reasoning in this framework; in 
[Galles and Pearl 1998], they provide a complete ax­
iomatic characterization of reasoning about causality 
in this framework, under the strong assumption that 
there is a fixed, given causal ordering of the equations. 
Roughly speaking, this means there is a way of order­
ing the variables that appear in the equations and we 
have explicit axioms that say Xj has no influence of 
Xi if Xi > Xi in this causal ordering. 
In this paper, I extend the results of Galles and Pearl 
by providing a complete axiomatic characterization for 
three increasingly general classes of causal models (de­
fined by structural equations): 
1. the class of recursive theories ( those without 
feedback-this generalizes the situation consid­
ered by Galles and Pearl [1998], since every fixed 
causal ordering of the variables gives rise to a re­
cursive theory), 
2. the class of theories where the solutions to the 
equations are unique, 
3. arbitrary theories ( where the equations may not 
have solutions and, if they do, they are not nec­
essarily unique). 
In the process, I clarify some problems in the Galles­
Pearl completeness proof that arise from the lack 
of propositional connectives ( particularly disjunction) 
in the language they consider and, more generally, 
highlight the role of the language in reasoning about 
causality. I also consider the complexity of the decision 
problem for all these languages and classes of models. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec­
tion 2, I give the syntax and semantics of the lan­
guages I will be considering and review the definition 
of modifiable causal models. In Section 3, I present 
the complete axiomatizations. In Section 4 I consider 
the complexity of the decision procedure. I conclude 
in Section 5. Some proofs are given in the appendix. 
2 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 
An axiomatization is given with respect to a particu­
lar language and a class of models, so we need to make 
both precise. Both the language and models I use are 
based on those considered by Galles and Pearl [1997, 
1998]. To make comparisons easier, I use their nota­
tion as much as possible. I start with the semantic 
model, since it motivates some of the choices in the 
syntax, then give the syntax, and finally define the 
semantics of formulas. 
Causal Models The basic picture here is that we 
are interested in the values of random variables, some 
of which have a causal effect on others. This effect is 
modeled by a set of structural equations. In practice, 
it seems useful to split the random variables into two 
sets, the exogenous variables, whose values are deter­
mined by factors outside the model, and the endoge­
nous variables. It is these endogenous variables whose 
values are described by the structural equations. 
More formally, a signature S is a tuple (U, X, {Vy : 
Y E U U X}), where U is a finite set of exogenous 
variables, X is a finite set of endogenous variables, 
and Vy is a set of possible values for each random 
variable Y E U U X. Unless explicitly noted otherwise, 
I assume that Vy is a finite set for each Y E U U X 
and IVx I 2:: 2. The assumption that X is finite is 
relatively innocuous; as we shall see, the assumption 
that Vy is finite has more of an impact on both the 
axioms and decision procedures. The assumption that 
IVx I ;::: 2 allows us to ignore the trivial situation where 
IVx I = 1. If IVx I= 1, we can just remove the variable 
X from the signature without loss of expressiveness. 
A causal model over signature S is a tuple T = 
(S, {Fx : X E X}), where {Fx : X E X} is a 
set of (modifiable) structural equations. The struc­
tural equation Fx is a function mapping ( x UEU Vu) x 
(xYEX-{X}VY) --+ Vx. Fx tells us the value of X 
given the values of all the other variables in U U X. 
Because Fx is a function, there is a unique value of 
X once we have set all the other variables.Notice we 
have such functions only for the endogenous variables. 
The exogenous variables are taken as given; it is their 
effect on the endogenous variables ( and the effect of 
the endogenous variables on each other) that we are 
modeling with the structural equations. 
Given a causal model T over signature S, a ( possibly 
empty) set X <;;;: X, and values x for the variables in 
X, we can define a new causal model denoted T x +-x( il) 
over the signature S' = (0, X - X, {Vy : Y E X - X}). 
Intuitively, this is the causal model that results when 
the variables in X are set to x and the variables in U 
are set toil. Formally, TX+-x(il) = (S', {F:·a :X E 
X - X}), where F:·a is obtained from Fy by setting 
the values of the variables in X to x and the values of 
the variables in U to il. 
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Notice that, in general, there may not be a unique 
vector of values that simultaneously satisfies the equa­
tions in Tx._o;(il); indeed, there may not be a solu­
tion at all. One special case where there is guaran­
teed to be such a unique solution is if there is some 
total ordering -< of the variables in X such that if 
X -< Y, then Fx is independent of the values of Y; 
i.e., Fx( . . .  , y, . . . ) = Fx( . . . , y', . . .  ) for ally, y' E Vy . 
In this case, the causal model is said to be recursive 
or acyclic. Intuitively, if the theory is recursive, there 
is no feedback. If X -< Y, then the value of X may 
affect the value of Y, but the value of Y has no effect 
on the value of X. 
It should be clear that if T is a recursive theory, then 
there is always a unique solution to the equations in 
Tx._o;(il), for all X, x, and il. ( We simply solve for 
the variables in the order given by -<.) On the other 
hand, as the following example shows, it is not hard 
to construct nonrecursive theories for which there is 
always a unique solution to the equations that arise. 
Example 2.1: Let S= (0, {X, Y}, {Vx, Vy} ), where 
Vx = Vy = {-1, 0, 1}, and letT= (S, {Fx, Fy}}, 
where Fx is characterized by the equation X = Y 
and Fy is characterized by the equation Y = -X. 
Clearly T is not recursive; the value of X depends on 
the value of Y and the value of Y depends on that 
of X. Nevertheless, it is easy to see that T has the 
unique solution X = 0, Y = 0, T x  +-x has the unique 
solution Y = -x, and Ty+-y has the unique solution 
X =y.l 
In this paper, I consider three successively more gen­
eral classes of causal models for a given signature 
S = (U, X, {Vy : Y E XuY}). 
1. Trec(S): the class of recursive causal models over 
signature S 
2. 'Tuniq(S): the class of causal models T over S 
where for all X <;;;: X, x, and il, the equations 
in TX+-x(il) have a unique solution, 
3. T(S): the class of all causal models over S. 
I often omit the signature S when it is clear from con­
text or irrelevant, but the reader should bear in mind 
its important role. 
Why should we be interested in causal models that do 
not possess unique solutions? Are there real causal 
systems that do not possess unique solutions? The 
issue of whether nonrecursive system can be given a 
causal interpretation is discussed at some length by 
Strotz and Wold [1960]. They argue that there are 
reasonable ways of interpreting causal interpretations 
where the answer is yes. It is not hard to see that 
under these interpretations, there may well be more 
than one solution to the equations. Perhaps the best 
way to view such equations is to think of the variables 
in X as being mutually interdependent; changing any 
one of them may cause a change in the others. ( Think 
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of demand and supply in economics or populations of 
rabbits and wolves.) The solutions to the equations 
then represent equilibrium situations. If there is more 
than one equilibrium, there will be more than one so­
lution to the equations. 
Syntax: I focus here on two languages. Both lan­
guages are parameterized by a signature S. The first 
language, £+(S), borrows ideas from dynamic logic 
[Harel 1979]. Again, I often write £+ rather than 
£+ ( S) (and similarly for the other languages defined 
below) to simplify the notation. A basic causal formula 
is one of the form [Y1 +--- Yl, ... , Yk +--- Yk]cp, where 
cp is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form 
X ( u) = X' yl' ... ' yk' X are variables in X' yl' ... ' yk 
are distinct, x E Vx, and u is a vector of values for 
all the variables in U. I typically abbreviate such a 
formula as [Y +--- YJcp. The special case where k = 0 
(which is allowed) is abbreviated as [true]cp. [Y +--- YJcp 
can be interpreted as "in all possible solutions to the 
structural equations obtained after setting Y,; to Yi, 
i = 1, ... , k, if the exogenous variables are set to u, 
then the value of random variable X will be x". As we 
shall see, this formula is true in a causal model T if in 
all solutions to the equations in Ty_g((u)), the ran­
dom variable X has value x. Note that this formula is 
trivially true if there are no solutions to the structural 
equations. A causal formula is a Boolean combination 
of basic causal formulas. 
Just as with dynamic logic, we can also define the 
formula (Y +--- fl)(X(u) = x) to be an abbreviation 
of -,[Y +--- YJ•(X(u) = x). (Y +--- if)(X(u) = x) is 
the dual of [Y +--- YJ(X(u) = x). Thus, for example, 
(Y +--- if) true is true if there is some solution to the 
equations obtained by setting Y,; to Yi, i = 1, ... , k 
(since [Y +--- YJfalse says that in every solution to the 
equations obtained by setting Y,; to Yi, false is true, and 
thus holds exactly if the equations have no solution). 
Let Luniq(S) be the sublanguage of £+(s) which con­
sists of Boolean combinations of formulas of the form 
[Y +--- YJX(u) = x. Thus, the difference between Luniq 
and .c+ is that in Luniq' only X ( u) = X is allowed 
after [Y +--- YJ, while in £+, arbitrary Boolean combi­
nations of formulas of the form X(u) = x are allowed. 
As we shall see, for reasoning about causality in 'Tuniq, 
the language Luniq is adequate, since it is equivalent 
in expressive power to £+. However, this is no longer 
the case when reasoning about causality in T. 
Following Galles and Pearl's notation, I often write 
[Y ,_ YJX(u) = x as Xy1-y1, •. ..Yk-Yk (u) = x. If the 
variables Y1, ... , Yk are clear from context or irrele­
vant, I further abbreviate this as Xg(u) = x. (This 
is actually the notation used by Galles and Pearl.) If 
k = 0 (i.e., Y is the empty sequence), following Galles 
and Pearl, I write X0(u) = x. Let .Cap(S) be the sub­
language of Luniq(S) consisting of just conjunctions of 
formulas of the form Xg(u) = x. In particular, it does 
not contain disjunctions of negations of such formulas. 
Although Galles and Pearl [1998] are not explicit about 
the language they are using, it seems to be .Cap .1 
Semantics A formula in £+ ( S) is true or false in a 
causal model in T(S). As usual, we write T I= cp if the 
causal formula cp is true in causal model T. For a basic 
causal formula, we have T I= [Y +--- YJ(X(u) = x) if in 
all solutions to Ty_g(u) (i.e., in all vectors of values 
for the variables in X - X that simultaneously satisfy 
all the equations Fy, for Y E X - X), the variable 
X has value x. We define the truth value of arbitrary 
causal formulas, which are just Boolean combinations 
of basic causal formulas, in the obvious way: 
• T I= cp1 1\ cp2 if T I= cp1 and T I= cp2 
• T I= •cp if T � cp. 
As usual, we say that a formula cp is valid with respect 
to a class T' of causal models if T I= cp for all T E T'. 
I can now make precise the earlier claim that in 'Tuniq 
(and hence Tree), the language Luniq is just as expres­
sive as the full language £+. 
Lemma 2.2 : The following formulas are valid in 
'Tuniq." 
(a) 'Tuniq I= [Y +--- YJ(cp V '1/J) ¢? [Y +--- YJcp V [Y +--- YJ'l/J, 
(b J Tuniq I= [Y ,_ YJ ( cp A '1/J) ¢? [Y ,_ YJcp A [Y ,_ YJ'l/J, 
(c) 'Tuniq I= [Y +--- YJ•cp ¢? •[Y +--- YJcp. 
Hence, in 'Tuniq, every formula in £+ is equivalent to 
a formula in Luniq. 
Proof: Straightforward; left to the reader. I 
Note that it follows from these equivalences that in 
'Tuniq, [Y +--- YJcp is equivalent to (Y +--- if)cp. It is also 
worth noting that Lemma 2.2(b) holds in arbitrary 
causal models in T, not just in 'Tuniq· However, parts 
(a) and (c) do not, as the following example shows. 
Example 2.3: Let S = (0, {X, Y}, {Vx, Vy} ), where 
Vx = Vy = {0,1}; let T = (S,{Fx,Fy}), where 
Fx is characterized by the equation X = Y and Fy 
is characterized by the equation Y = X. Clearly 
T � 'Tuniqi both ( 0, 0) and (1, 1) are solutions to T. 
It is easy to see that T I= [true](X = 0 V X = 
1) 1\ •[true](X = 0) 1\ •[true](X = 1) and T I= 
•[true](X = 1) 1\ •[true]•(X = 1), showing that nei­
ther part (a) nor part (c) of Lemma 2. 2 hold in T. 
I 
1This was confirmed by Judea Pearl [private communi­
cation, 1997]. 
3 COMPLETE AXIOMATIZATIONS 
I briefly recall some standard definitions from logic. 
An axiom system AX consists of a collection of ax­
ioms and inference rules. An axiom is a formula (in 
some predetermined language £), and an inference 
rule has the form "from <p1, . . .  , <{ik infer '¢," where 
<p1, . . . , <pk, 'ljJ are formulas in £. A proof in AX con­
sists of a sequence of formulas in £, each of which is 
either an axiom in AX or follows by an application 
of an inference rule. A proof is said to be a proof of 
the formula <p if the last formula in the proof is <p. We 
say <p is provable in AX, and write AX 1- <p, if there is a 
proof of <p in AX; similarly, we say that <p is consistent 
with AX if -.<p is not provable in AX. 
An axiom system AX is said to be sound for a language 
C with respect to a class T' of causal models if every 
formula in C provable in AX is valid with respect to 
T'. The system AX is complete for C with respect to 
T' if every formula in C that is valid with respect to 
T' is provable in AX. 
We now want to find axioms that characterize 
the classes of causal models in which we are in­
terested, namely Tree, Tuniq, and T. To deal 
with Tree, it is helpful to define Y � Z, read 
"Y affects Z", as an abbreviation for the formula 
V XCX,xEIIxex Vx ,yEVy>iZEITueu Vu,z#z'EVz (Zxy(u) = z' 1\ 
Zx-( u) = z) . Thus, Y affects Z if there is some setting 
of the exogenous variables and some other endogenous 
variables for which changing the value of Y changes 
the value of Z. This definition is used in axiom C6 
below, which characterizes recursiveness. 
Consider the following axioms: 
CO. All instances of propositional tautologies. 
Cl. Xg(il) = x :::::> Xg(il) =f. x') if x,x' E Vx, x =f. x' 
(equality) 
C2. YxEVxXg(il) = x (definiteness) 
C3. (Wx-(il) = w 1\ Yx-(il) = y) :::::> Yx-w(il) = y 
(composition) 
C4. Xx-w(il) = x (effectiveness) 
C5. Yx-w(il) = y 1\ Wx-y(il) = w :::::> Yx-(il) = y 
(reversibility) 
C6. (Xo � X1 1\ . . .  1\ Xk, � Xk) :::::> -.(Xk � Xo) 
(recursiveness) 
We have one rule of inference: 
MP. From <p and <p :::::> '1/J, infer 'ljJ (modus ponens) 
C1 just states an obvious property of equality: if 
X = x for every solution of the equations in Tx-(il), 
then we cannot have X = x', if x' =f. x. 2 In a 
2In an earlier draft of this paper, where Cl and C2 were 
introduced, Cl was called "uniqueness". Galles and Pearl 
[1998] then adopted this name as well. In retrospect, this 
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richer language, this could have been expressed as 
(Xg(il) = x 1\ Xg(il) = x') :::::> (x = x') , but this 
formula is not in c+ (since c+ does not include ex­
pressions such as x' = x) . C2 states that there is some 
value x E Vx which is the value of X in all solutions 
to the equations in Tx-(il). C2 is not valid in T, but it 
is valid in I;miq· Note that in stating C2, I am making 
use of the fact that Vx is finite (otherwise C2 would 
involve an infinite disjunction, and would no longer be 
a formula in Luniq). In fact, as I show in the full paper, 
if we allow signatures where the sets Vx are infinite, 
we only include C2 for those random variables X such 
that Vx is finite.3 C3-C5 were introduced by Galles 
and Pearl [1997, 1998], as were their names. Roughly 
speaking, C3 says that if the value of W is w in all 
solutions to the equations Tx-(il), then all solutions to 
the equations in T;;w(il) are the same as the solutions 
to the equations in T;;(u). C3 is valid in T as well 
as Tuniq. As we shall see, a variant of C3 (obtained 
by replacing "all" by "some") is also valid in T. C4 
simply says that in all solutions obtained after setting 
X to x, the value of X is x. C5 is perhaps the least 
obvious of these axioms; the proof of its soundness is 
not at all straightforward. It says that if setting X to 
x and W to w results in Y having value y and setting 
X to x and Y to y results in W having value w, then 
Y must already have value when we set X to x (and 
W must already have value w) . 
Finally, it is easy to see that C6 holds in recursive 
models. For if Y � Z, then Y must precede Z in the 
causal ordering. Thus, if Xo � X1 1\ . . . 1\Xk-1 � Xk, 
then Xo must precede Xk in the causal ordering, so Xk 
cannot affect Xa. Thus, -.(Xk � X0) holds. As we 
shall see, in a precise sense, C6 characterizes recursive 
models. 
C6 can be viewed as a collection of axioms (actually, 
axiom schemes), one for each k. The case k = 1 al­
ready gives us -.(Y � Z) V -.(Z � Y )  for all variables 
Y and Z. That is, it tells us that, for any pair of 
variables, at most one affects the other. However, just 
restricting C6 to the case of k = 1 does not suffice to 
characterize Tree, as the following example shows. 
Example 3.1 : Let S = (0, {X0, X1, X 2}, {Vx0, 
Vx,, Vx2} ), where Vxi = {0, 1, 2} for i = 0, 1, 2, and 
letT= (S, {Fx0, Fx,, Fx2} ), where Fxi is character­
ized by the equation 
x- _ { 2 if xiel = 1 • - 0 otherwise 
and 8 is addition mod 3. It is easy to see that 
T E Tuniq: If any of the variables are set, the equa­
tions completely determine the values of all the other 
axiom really does not say anything about uniqueness. The 
axiom which does is DlO, which will be discussed later. 
3The assumption that Vx and X are finite also neces­
sary for the abbreviation X -v.- Y used in C6 to be in .Cuniq; 
however, as I show in the full paper, there is a variant of 
C6 that applies both for finite and infinite signatures. 
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variables. On the other hand, if none of the variables 
are set, it is easy to see that (0, 0, 0) is the only so­
lution that satisfies all the equations. Moreover, in 
T x <-x' the variable Xi is 0 unless it is set to a value 
other than 0 or Xiel is set to 1. It easily follows that 
Xi is affected only by Xiel· A straightforward verifi­
cation (or an appeal to Theorem 3.2 below) shows that 
T satisfies all the axioms other than C6. C6 does not 
hold in T, since T I= Xo '"'-'t X1 /\X1 '"'-'t X2 /\X2 '"'-'t Xo. 
This also shows that T is not recursive. However, the 
restricted version of C6 (where k = 1) does hold in 
T. A generalization of this example (with k random 
variables rather than just 2) can be used to show that 
we cannot bound k at all in C6; we need it to hold for 
all finite values of k. I 
Let AXuniq(S) consist of CO-C5 and MP; let AXrec(S) 
consist of CO-C4, C6, and MP. We could include C5 in 
AXrec(S); I did not do so because, as Galles and Pearl 
(1998] point out, it follows from C3 and C6. Note that 
the signature S is a parameter of the axiom system, 
just as it is for the language and the set of models. This 
is because, for example, the set Vx (which is part of 
S) appears explicitly in C1 and C2. 
Theorem 3.2 : AXuniq(S) {resp. , AXrec(S)) is a 
sound and complete axiomatization for .Cuniq(S) with 
respect to �miq(S) {resp., Trec(S)). 
Proof: See the appendix. I 
As I said in the introduction, Galles and Pearl (1998] 
prove a similar completeness result for causal models 
whose variables satisfy a fixed causal ordering. Given 
a total ordering -< on the variables in X, consider the 
following axiom: 
Ord. Yxw(it) = Yx(it) if Y-< W 
Since x, w, and it are implicitly universally quantified 
in Ord, this axiom says that •(W '"'-'t Y) holds if Y -< 
W. It follows that if W '"'-'t Y, then W -< Y. From this 
and the fact that -< is a total order, it is easy to see 
that Ord implies C6. 
Galles and Pearl show that C1-C4 and Ord is a sound 
and complete axiomatization with respect to the class 
of structures satisfying Ord for their language (.Cap). 
More precisely, Galles and Pearl take Ac to consist of 
the axioms C1-C4 and Ord (but not CO or MP), and 
show, in their notation, that S I= O" implies Sf-Ac O", 
where S U { O"} is a set of formulas in .Cap. There is an 
important subtle point worth stressing about their re­
sult: C1-C3, which are axioms in Ac, are not express­
ible in .Cap (since their statement involves disjunction 
and negation). 
So what exactly is Galles and Pearl's result saying? 
They interpret S I= O", as usual, as meaning that in all 
causal models satisfying S, O" is true.4 They interpret 
4 Although they do not say this explicitly, it is clear that 
S f-Ac O" as meaning that O" is provable from S and 
the axioms in the axioms of Ac "together with the 
rules of logic", which presumably means CO and MP. 
It follows easily from Theorem 3.2 that their result is 
correct (see below), but is unlike typical soundness and 
completeness proofs, since the proof of O" from S will in 
general involve formulas in ..Cuniq that are not in .Cap. 
(In particular, this will happen whenever C1-C3 are 
used in the proof.) 
To see that Galles and Pearl's result follows from The­
orem 3.2, defineS* to be the formula in .Cuniq(S) which 
is the conjunction of the formulas in S (there can only 
be finitely many, since .Cap ( S) itself has only finitely 
many distinct formulas), together with the conjunc­
tion of all the instances of the axiom Ord (again, there 
are only finitely many). Note that S I= O" holds iff 
'Tuniq(S) I= S* => O" (since the formulas in Ord guar­
antee that the only causal models that satisfy S* are 
recursive, and hence are in 'Tuniq(S)). Thus, by The­
orem 3.2, S I= O" iff AXuniq ( S) f- S* => 0", and this 
latter statement is equivalent to S f-Ac O", as defined 
by Galles and Pearl. In fact, Theorem 3.2 shows that 
AXuniq(S) + Ord gives a sound and complete axiom­
atization with respect to causal models satisfying Ord 
for the language .Cuniq(S), which allows Boolean con­
nectives. (Of course, Theorem 3.2 shows more, since 
it extends Galles and Pearl's result to Trec(S) and 
'Tuniq ( S).) This suggests that .Cuniq is a more appropri­
ate language for reasoning about causality than .Cap, 
at least for causal models in 'Tuniq· .Cap cannot express 
a number of properties of causal reasoning of interest 
(for example, the ones captured by axioms C1-C3). 
When we use .Cuniq, not only is every formula in .Cuniq 
valid in 'Tuniq provable from the axioms in AXuniq, but 
the proof involves only formulas in .Cuniq. 
What about T? I have not been able to find a complete 
axiomatization for the language .Cuniq with respect to 
T. However, I do not think that finding a complete 
axiomatization for .Cuniq with respect to T is of great 
interest, because .Cuniq is simply not a language ap­
propriate for reasoning about causality in T. Because 
there is not necessarily a unique solution to the equa­
tions that arise in a causal model T E T, it is useful 
to be able to say both that there exists a solution with 
certain properties and that all solutions have certain 
properties. This is precisely what the language .c+ 
lets us do.5 As I now show, there is in fact an ele­
gant sound and complete axiomatization for .c+ with 
respect to T. 
Consider the following axioms: 
they intend to further restrict to structures satisfying S and 
Ord, for the fixed order -<. Without this restriction, their 
result is not true. 
5Note that .c+ allows us to say that there is a unique 
solution for a random variable X after setting some other 
variables. For example, (Y ,...._ f!)truel\ [Y <-- ilJ(X(iZ) = x) 
says that there are solutions to the equations when Y is 
set to fj and, in all of them, X is uniquely determined to 
be x (if the exogenous variables are set to it). 
D O. All instances of propositional tautologies. 
D l. [Y .- YJ(X(it) = x::::} X(it) =/: x') if x,x' E Vx, 
x =f: x' (functionality) 
D2. [Y <---- YJ VxEVx X( it)= x (definiteness) 
D 3. ex.- x)(W(it) = w 1\¥ =g) 
::::} ex.- x; w .- w)(Y =g) (composition) 
D4. [W .- w; X.- x](X(it) = x) (effectiveness) 
us. ((X.- x; Y .- y)(W(it) = w A Z(it) = z) A 
(X.- x; w .- w)Y(it) = y A Z(it) = Z))::::} 
(X.- x)W(it) = w A Y(it) = y A Z(it) = Z)), 
where Z =X- (X U {W, Y}) (reversibility) 
D6. (Xo'""' X1 A . . .  A Xk1 '"'-* Xk) ::::} •(Xk '"'-* Xo) 
(recursiveness) 
D7. ([X.- X]<p A [X.- x](<p::::} '1/J))::::} [X.- x]'I/J 
(distribution) 
D8. [X <---- x]<p if <p is a propositional tautology 
(generalization) 
D9. (Y <---- iJ)true 1\ VxEVx ([Y <---- YJ(X(it) = x) if Y = 
X- {X} (unique solutions for X- {X}) 
D10. (Y .- iJ)truel\ VxEVx([Y .- YJ(X(it) = x) 
(unique solutions) 
D1-D6 are the analogues of C1-C6 in .c+. D 4  and 
D6 are just C4 and C6, with no changes at all. The 
other axioms are not quite the same though. For ex­
ample, C1 is actually [Y <---- YJ(X(it) = x) ::::} -,[Y <­
YJ(X(it) = x')) if x =/: x'. By Lemma 2.2, this is 
equivalent to D1 in 'Tuniqi however, the two formu­
las are not equivalent in general. Similarly, C2 is 
VxEVx [Y <---- YJ(X(it) = x), which is closer to D10 than 
D2 (since the disjunction is outside the scope of the 
[Y <---- YJ .  Again, D10 and D 2  are equivalent in 'Tuniq 
(both are equivalent to C2 in this case) but, in gen­
eral, D10 is stronger than D 2. Only D 2  and D9, both 
weaker than D10, hold in T. The exact analogue of C3 
would use [] instead of ( ) and say Y (it) = y instead 
of Y(it) = fj. For completeness, it is necessary to have 
a vector of variables here. Using [] instead of ( ) also 
results in a valid formula (and would not require a vec-
tor Y). While the two variants are equivalent in 'Tuniq, 
they are different in general, and the one given here is 
the more useful. (More precisely, with it we get com­
pleteness, while the version with [] does not suffice for 
completeness. ) Similarly, in D 5, we use () instead of 
[], and add the extra clause Z (it) = z. Both turn out 
to be necessary for soundness. In some sense, we can 
think of D1-D6 as capturing the "true content" of C1-
C6, once we drop the assumption that the structural 
equations have a unique solution. D7 and D8 are stan­
dard properties of modal operators. D10 is what we 
need to capture the fact that the structural equations 
have unique solutions. 
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Let Ax+ consist of D O-D 5, D7-D9, and MP (modus 
ponens); let AX�niq be the result of adding D10 to 
AX+; let AXtec be the result of adding D6 to AX�niq· 
Theorem 3.3: Ax+ (S) {resp. , Ax,;niq(S), Ax;:';,c (S)) 
is a sound and complete axiomatization for£+ ( S) with 
respect to T(S) (resp. , Tuniq(S), Trec(S)). 
Proof: See the appendix. I 
4 D ECISION PROCEDURES 
In this section I consider the complexity of deciding 
if a formula is satisfiable (or valid). This, of course, 
depends on the language (£+, .Cuniq, or .CGP) and the 
class of models (Tree, 'Tuniq, T) we consider. It also 
depends on how we formulate the problem. 
One version of the problem is to consider a fixed sig­
nature S = (U, X, {Vy : Y E U U X}, and ask how 
hard it is to decide if a formula <p E .c+(S) (resp., 
.Cuniq(S), £Gp(S)) is satisfiable in Trec(S) (resp., 
Tuniq(S), T(S)). If S is finite (that is, if X and U 
are finite and Vy is finite for each Y E U E X), this 
turns out to be quite easy, for trivial reasons. 
Theorem 4.1: If S is a fixed finite signature , the 
problem of deciding if a formula <p E .c+(S) {resp. , 
.Cuniq(S), .CGp(S) ) is satisfiable in Trec(S) (resp., 
Tuniq(S), T(S)) can be solved in time linear in l<pl {the 
length of <p viewed as a string of symbols) . 
Proof: If S is finite, there are only finitely many 
causal structures in S, independent of <p .  Given <p, 
we can explicitly check if <p is satisfied in any (or all) 
of them. This can be done in time linear in l<pl . Since 
S is not a parameter to the problem, the huge num­
ber of possible structures that we have to check only 
affects the constant. I 
We can do even better than Theorem 4.1 suggests if S 
is a fixed finite signature. Suppose that X consists of 
100 variables and <p mentions only 3 of them. A causal 
model must specify the equations for all100 variables. 
Is it really necessary to consider what happens to the 
97 variables not mentioned in <p to decide if <p is sat­
isfiable or valid? As the following result shows, if we 
restrict to models in 'Tuniq, then we need to check only 
the variables that appear in S; for models in T, we 
need to allow one more variable. 
More precisely, given a formula <p and signature S, let 
the signature Scp = ( {U*}, X', {V{ : Y E X' U {U*} ), 
where X' consists of the variables in X that appear in 
<p, U* is a fresh exogenous variable, not mentioned in 
X or U, V_:k = Vx for X E X', and Vu• consists of 
all those tuples in x UEU Vu that are mentioned in <p. 
Let S� be the same as Scp except that it has one fresh 
endogenous variable X*, with Vx• = UxEX'Vx. 
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Theorem 4.2: A formula <p E .c+(S) is satisfiable in 
Tree(S) {resp., 'Tuniq(S)) iff it is satisfiable in Tree(S'P) 
( resp., 'Tuniq ( SP)); <p is satisfiable in T ( S) iff it is sat­
isfiable in T(S;J;). 
Proof: See the full paper. I 
Since Theorem 4.2 applies to all formulas in .c+(s), it 
applies a fortiori to formulas in .Cuniq(S) and .Cap(S). 
Although stated only in terms of satisfiability, it is im­
mediate that it also holds for validity. It tells us that 
without loss of generality, when considering satisfiabil­
ity or validity, we need to consider only finitely many 
variables (essentially, only the ones that appear in <p, 
and perhaps one more).6 In this sense, we can restrict 
to signatures with only finitely many variables without 
loss of generality. Note that this result does not tell 
us that we can restrict to finite sets of values for these 
variables without loss of generality. 
Returning to the complexity of the decision problem, 
note that Theorem 4.1 is the analogue of the obser­
vation that for propositional logic, the satisfiability 
problem is in linear time if we restrict to a fixed set 
of primitive propositions. The proof that the satisfi­
ability problem for propositional logic is NP-complete 
implicitly assumes that we have an unbounded number 
of primitive propositions at our disposal. 
There are two ways to get an analogous result here. 
The first is to allow the signature S to be infinite and 
the second is to make the signature part of the input 
to the problem. The results in both cases are similar. 
Theorem 4.3: Given as input a pair ( <p, S), where 
<p E .c+(S) {resp. , .Cuniq(S), .Cap(S)) and S is a fi­
nite signature, the problem of deciding if <p is satis­
fiable with respect to T {resp., {resp., Tree, 'Tuniq) is 
NP-hard and in NEXPTIME {nondeterministic expo­
nential time). 
Proof: It is quite straightforward to encode the sat­
isfiability problem for propositional logic into the sat­
isfiability problem for these logics. The details appear 
in the full paper. However, it is worth noting that a 
special encoding is needed for .Cap, and the encoding 
makes crucial use of the fact that Vx is finite for each 
endogenous variable X. 
The upper bound is also straightforward: We simply 
guess a satisfying model and verify that it indeed satis­
fies <p. The reason we get nondeterministic exponential 
time rather than nondeterministic polynomial time is 
that the description of a causal model can be exponen­
tial in lr.pl ,  and computing the solutions to the equa­
tions also takes exponential time. For example, if <p 
mentions the variables X1, . .. , Xn+I, each of which 
has two possible values, then each of the equations 
Fx1, • . .  , Fx,. has 2n possible inputs, and we have to 
say what the output is for each of them. I 
6 As I show in the full paper, the extra variable is nec­
essary in the case of T(S). 
One way of improving the upper bound of Theorem 4.3 
would be to show that if a formula is satisfiable at 
all, it is satisfiable in a model that has a short (i.e., 
polynomial-length) description. In the case of Tree, 
this technique provides a matching upper bound. 
Theorem 4.4: Given as input a pair ( <p, S), where 
<p E .c+(S) {resp., .Cuniq(S), .Cap(S)) and S is a finite 
signature, the problem of deciding if <p is satisfiable 
with respect to Tree(S) is NP-complete. 
Proof: See the full paper. I 
I conjecture that it should be possible to similar NP­
completeness results for 'Tuniq and T, but I have not 
yet been able to do this. 
Results similar to Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 hold for the 
case where S is an infinite signature. For example, as 
is shown in the full paper, slight modifications to the 
proof of Theorem 4.4 give us the following result. 
Theorem 4.5: If S is a fixed infinite signature, the 
problem of deciding if a formula <p E .c+(S) (resp., 
.Cuniq(S), .Cap(S)) is satisfiable in Tree(S) is NP­
complete. 
One interesting difference is observed in the case of the 
language .Cap. Having infinitely many possible values 
makes the decision problem easier in this case. In fact, 
even the implication problem for formulas in .Cap is in 
polynomial time. 
Theorem 4.6: If S is an infinite signature where for 
all but finitely many of the variables X E X, we have 
!Vxl = oo, then we can decide if the formula <p E 
.Cap(S) is satisfiable or valid with respect to Tree(S) in 
time polynomial in i<fYI· In fact, we can decide whether 
<p1 => </)2 is valid with respect to Tree ( S), for <p1, <p2 E 
.Cap(S), in time polynomial in l<fY1 => <p2l· 
Proof: See the full paper. I 
5 CONCLUSION 
I have provided complete axiomatizations and decision 
procedures for propositional languages for reasoning 
about causality. I have tried to stress the important 
role of the choice of language in both the axiomatiza­
tions and, more generally, in the reasoning process. 
Both the models and the languages considered here 
are somewhat limited. For example, a more general 
approach to modeling causality would allow there to 
be more than one value of X once we have set all 
the other variables. This would be appropriate if we 
model things at a somewhat coarser level of granular­
ity, where the values of all the variables other than X 
do not suffice to completely determine the value of X. 
I believe the results of this paper can be extended in 
a straightforward way to deal with this generalization, 
although I have not checked the details. For general 
causal reasoning, I believe we need a richer language, 
which includes some first-order features. I hope to 
return to the issue of finding appropriate richer lan­
guages for causal reasoning in future work. 
A PROOFS 
Theorem 3.2: AXuniq (resp., AXrec) is a sound and 
complete axiomatization for .Cuniq ( S) with respect to 
'Tuniq(S) (resp., Trec(S)). 
Proof: Soundness is proved by Galles and Pearl. To 
make the paper self-contained, I reprove the only non­
obvious case-the validity of C5 in Tuniq. 
Let T E Tuniq and suppose that T � Yzw(it) = 
yt\Wzy(it) = w. We want to show thatT �Yz(it) =y. 
Since we are in Tuniq, there is a unique vector ih that 
satisfies the equations in Tzw (it) and a unique vector 
ih that satisfies the equations in Tzy( it). I claim that 
ih = v2. By assumption, the X, Y, and W compo­
nents of these vectors are the same (x, y, and w, re­
spectively). Now consider the theory Txyw(it). I claim 
that VI and v2 are both solutions to that theory. Note 
that for any variable Z other than those in XU {W, Y}, 
the equation F;w,u for Z in Tzw( it) is the same as 
the equations F;y,u and F;yw,u for Z in Tzy(it) and 
Txyw(il), respectively, except that in the first case, w 
has been plugged in as the value of W ,  in the second 
casey has been plugged in as the value of Y, and in 
the third case, both w and y have been plugged in. 
However, since w and y are the values of W and Y, 
respectively, in both ih and v2, and since these vectors 
satisfy both equation Fiw and F;Y, they must also 
satisfy F;wy. Since the equations for Txyw (it) have a 
unique solution, we have that VI = Vz, as desired. 
Next, I claim that VI satisfies the equations in Tz(it). 
Again, as above, it is clear that it satisfies the equa­
tion for Z tf: Xu {W, Y}. A similar argument shows 
that it satisfies the equation for Y in Tz(it), since ih 
satisfies the equation for Y in Tzw(it). Finally, a sim­
ilar argument shows that it satisfies the equation for 
Win Tz(il), since v2 =VI satisfies the equation for W 
in Tzy(u). Since theY component of ih is y, it follows 
that Yz(il) = y. 
So much for soundness. For completeness, it suffices 
to prove that if a formula in .Cuniq is consistent with 
AXuniq (resp. , AXrec), then it is satisfied in a causal 
model in Tuniq (resp. , Tree). I now give the argument 
in the case of AXuniq. 
Suppose that a formula <{! E .Cuniq(S), with S = 
(U, X, {Vy : Y E U U X}), is consistent with AXuniq· 
Consider a maximal consistent set C of formulas that 
includes <P· (A maximal consistent set is a set of for­
mulas whose conjunction is consistent such that any 
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larger set of formulas would be inconsistent.) It fol­
lows easily from standard propositional reasoning (i.e., 
using CO and MP only) that such a maximal consis­
tent set exists. Moreover, from Cl and C2, it follows 
that for each random variable X E X and vector y of 
values, there exists exactly one element x E Vx such 
that Xil = x E C. I now construct a causal model 
T = ( S, F) E Tuniq ( S) that satisfies every formula in 
C (and, in particular, satisfies <P). 
A term X y -il( u) is complete (for X) if Y consists 
of all the variables in X - X. Thus, Xy -il( u) is a 
complete term if every random variable other than X 
is determined. We use the complete terms to define 
the structural equations. For each variable in X E X, 
define Fx(it, ff) = x if Xil(u) = x, where Xy(u) is a 
complete term. This gives us a causal model T. Now 
we have to show that this model is in Tuniq and that 
all the formulas in C are satisfied by T. 
I show that X y +-iJ( it) = x is in C iff T � X y -il( it) = 
x by induction on lXI - IYI. The case where lX I ­
IYI = 0 follows immediately from C4, since then X 
is in Y. If lXI - IYI =/:. 0, we can assume without 
loss of generality that X is not in Y, for otherwise the 
result again follows from C4. Given this assumption, 
if lXI - !YI = 1, the result follows by definition of the 
equations Fx. 
For the general case, suppose that lXI- I YI = k > 1. 
We want to show that there is a unique solution to the 
equations in Ty_il(u) and that, in this solution, X 
has value x. To see that there is a solution, we define 
a vector v and show that it is in fact a solution. If 
W E Y and W +-- w is the assignment to W in Y +-- y, 
then we set the W component of v tow. If W is not 
in Y, then set the W component of v to the unique 
value w* such that W y +-iJ( it) = w* is in C. (By Cl 
and C2 there is such a unique value w.) I claim that 
v is a solution to the equations in Ty_il(u). 
To see this, let W be a variable in X not in Y. Let Y' = 
YW . By C3 and C4, for every variable Z E X - Y', 
we have Zyw• (it) = z*. Since lX I - !Y'I = k- 1, 
by the inductive hypothesis, v is in fact the unique 
solution for TiJw•(it). For every variable Z in X- Y', 
the equation Fjw* ,a for Z in TiJw* (it) is the same as 
the equation Fj·11 for Z in Til( it), except that W is set 
tow*. Thus, every equation in Ty(u) except possibly 
the equation Pf/ is satisfied by v. To see that Ffj;11 is 
also satisfied by v, simply repeat this argument above 
starting with another variable W '  in X- Y. (Such a 
variable must exist since lX I - IYI was assumed to be 
at least 2.) 
It remains to show that v is the unique solution to 
the equations in Til( it). Suppose there were another 
solution, say iJ', to the equations. Suppose that for 
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each variable W in X - Y, the W component of V' 
is w**. For some variable Z, we must have z** =f:. 
z*. Since Zg( u) = z*, by assumption, it follows from 
Cl  that Zg(u) =f:. z** is in C (since C is a maximal 
consistent set). It is also easy to see that for each 
W in X - Y, the vector V' is also a solution to the 
equations in Tgw•• ( u). Let W be a variable other than 
Z in X- Y. By the induction hypothesis, it follows 
that Wgz•• ( u) = w** and Zgw•• ( u) = z** are both in 
C. By C5 (reversibility), Zg(u) = z** is in C. But 
this contradicts the consistency of C. 
This completes the proof in the case of 'Tuniq(S). Es­
sentially the same proof works for 'Tree· We just need 
to observe that C6 guarantees that the theory we con­
struct can be taken to be recursive. To see this, given 
a formula t.p consistent with 'Tree, consider a maximal 
set C of formulas consistent with 'Tree that contains 
<.p. Let Tc be the causal model determined by C, as 
above. The set C also determines a relation -< on the 
exogenous variables: define Y -< Z if Y � Z E C. It 
easily follows from C6 that the transitive closure -<* 
of -< is a partial order: if X -<* Y and Y -<* X, then 
X = Y. Any total order on the variables consistent 
-<* gives an ordering for which Tc is recursive. I 
Theorem 3.3: Ax+ (resp. , Ax,;niq' AX.:.,e) is a 
sound and complete axiomatization for .c+ ( S) with re­
spect to T(S) (resp., 'Tuniq(S), 'Tree(S)). 
Proof: Soundness proceeds much as that of Theo­
rem 3.2; I leave details to the reader. For completeness, 
we again proceed much as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. 
Because the proofs are so similar in spirit, I just sketch 
the proof for AX+; the modifications for AX�niq and 
AXt,e are left to the reader. 
Again, given a formula <.p consist with AX+, we con­
sider a maximal consistent set of formulas containing 
<.p that is consistent with AX+, and use it to construct 
a causal model T. Note that D9 suffices for this, be­
cause in defining F x ( u, fi), we needed to know only the 
unique x such that [Y <-- YJ(X(u) = x) for Y = X  -X, 
and D9 (together with Dl) assures us that there is a 
unique such x. Again, we want to show that all the 
formulas in C are satisfied by T. 
Standard techniques of modal logic (using DO, D7, D8, 
and MP) can be used to show that {Y <-- y') ( '-Pl V t.p2) E 
C iff either {Y <-- YJ'-Pl E C or {Y <-- YJ'-P2 E C. From 
D2 it follows that {Y <-- y') ( t.p 1\ X ( u) =/:. X) E c iff 
{Y <-- Y}(t.p/\ (Vx'EVx-{x}X(u) = x') E C. From these 
two facts, it easily follows that it suffices to show that 
{Y .-- Y>CX(u) = x) E c iff T F= {Y .-- fi)(X(u) = x) 
for X = X - Y. To do this, we proceed by induction 
on lXI - iYI again. The base case is dealt with using 
D4, as before. So assume that k � 1 and lXI- 1111 = 
k + 1. Suppose that {Y <-- y')(X(u) = x) E c. Let 
xl, x2 E X. Suppose that xl <-- Xl and x2 <-- X2 
are the assignments to xl and x2 in X <-- x. Let 
x' .-- x' and x" .-- x" be the result of removing 
xl <-- Xl and x2 <-- X2, respectively, from X <-- X. 
By D3, both {Y <-- y; xl <-- xl)(X"(u) = x") and 
{Y <-- y; x2 <-- X2)(X'(u) = x') are in C. By the 
induction hypothesis, both of these formulas are true 
in T. By the soundness of D5, it follows that T F= 
{Y .-- Y)(X(u) = x'), as desired. 
C onversely, suppose that T F {Y <-- y')(X(u) = x'). 
Then, since D3 is sound, we have that T F= {Y <­
y; xl <-- xl)(X"(u) = x") and T F {Y <-- y; x2 <­
X2)(X'(u) = x'). By the induction hypothesis, we have 
that both {Y .-- fi; x1 .-- x1)(X"(u) = x") and {Y .-­
fi; x2 <-- X2)(X'(u) = x') are in C. We now apply D5 
to complete the proof. I 
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